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Unlike social programs targeting individuals, few 
enterprise support programs have been rigorously 
evaluated, and existing evaluations have mostly been 
done in high-income countries such as the United States 
and Europe. Mexico spends a large share of government 
resources on small and medium enterprise programs 
each year. How effective these programs have been in 
achieving their objectives is unclear.  In Mexico, impact 
evaluations of small and medium enterprise programs 
are rare, and most are qualitative in nature. This is the 
first paper evaluating these programs in Mexico using 
firm-level panel data. The continuous and ten-year panel 
This paper—a product of the Poverty and Gender Unit, Latin American and the Caribbean Region—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to increase knowledge on impact evaluation and on firm’s productivity. Policy Research Working 
Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at gacevedo@worldbank.org.   
data—from the 1994–2005 period—allow the authors to 
address selectivity bias and unobserved firm heterogeneity 
by applying a generalization of differences-in-differences 
models combined with propensity score matching 
methods. This study finds evidence that participation in 
small and medium enterprise programs is associated with 
improvements in key variables such as value added, gross 
production, and wages. Furthermore, the study finds 
evidence that some of the positive effects can take several 
years to realize. The results also call for streamlining 
and greater efficiency in Mexico's small and medium 
enterprise programs. 
MEXICO: IMPACT EVALUATION OF SME PROGRAMS USING PANEL FIRM DATA
1
Gladys Lopez-Acevedo  
 
(Senior Economist, LCSPP) 
Monica Tinajero 












Keywords:  small and medium enterprises, program impact evaluation 
 
JEL codes:  L25, L53, O25, O54 
Contact information: gacevedo@worldbank.org 
   
                                                           
1 This country study was funded by a research grant RF-P105213-RESE-BB from the World Bank’s Research 
Committee for the project “Evaluating Small and Medium Enterprise Support Programs in Latin America” managed 
by LCSPP and directed by Gladys Lopez-Acevedo and Hong Tan.  We acknowledge the close collaboration offered 
by Abigail Durán and Adriana Ramirez from the headquarters of the Mexican National Statistics Office (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia—INEGI). We also acknowledge the contributions and background paper on the 
“Review of SME Programs” from Jorge Mario Soto, Hugo Fuentes  and Victor Aramburu (ITESM). We 
acknowledge the technical guidance from Hong Tan and his paper on “Evaluating SME Support Programs in Chile,” 
forthcoming as a World Bank Research paper. We thank David McKenzie in particular for his expert guidance on 




Microenterprises and SMEs make up 99 percent of enterprises in Mexico, employ about 64 
percent of the workforce, and account for over 40 percent of GDP.  Given the importance of 
SME in the economy, governments in Mexico over the last 20 years have put in place a wide 
variety of SME support programs. An inventory of programs—an important contribution of 
this study, as such information is not generally available—identified 151 SME programs 
administered by different government agencies.  
How effective these SME programs have been in achieving their objectives is unclear.  In 
Mexico, impact evaluations of SME programs are rare—most are qualitative in nature and 
narrow in scope, either measuring beneficiary satisfaction with support services or easily 
quantified program coverage indicators. None take into account the complicated biases from 
unobserved firm heterogeneity and self-selection that plague efforts to measure the true 
impacts of program participation.  
This paper uses econometric techniques to estimate the net impacts of SME program 
participation on outcomes. Techniques used include  regressions models with program 
participation indicators and controls for firm characteristics, propensity score matching 
techniques, and a generalization of difference-in-differences (DID) methods using pre- and 
post-program panel data adapted to the nature of our panel data. The panel data is created by 
linking SME program participation information (which identifies the treatment and control 
groups) to a large panel of annual industrial surveys (1994-2005) maintained by Mexico’s 
National Statistics Office (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía—INEGI). Impacts 
are estimated at the agency level (groups of programs run by a given agency or ministry) and 
in selected cases by program, when data allowed for estimations to be carried out. 
The paper finds that program participation in certain types of SME programs is associated 
with higher value added, sales, export, and employment.  The positive impact associated with 
firm participation in SME programs is strongest in the programs of the Ministry of Economy 
(ME) and the National Science and Technology Council (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y 
Tecnología—CONACyT). Our panel data allows us to identify the timing of the effects of 
program participation on outcomes. We found positive and significant impact for firms 
participating in SME programs that range from 5 percent in value added to 6 percent in 
employment, among other outcomes. These results remain robust after trimming the 5 
percent of the treatment group for each outcome variable. Some of these positive effects 
materialize after the third or fourth year after exposure into the program. We found that the 
programs in the ME and CONACyT have the largest impact on outcomes. CONACyT’s 
fiscal support and technical innovation program had a positive and significant effect, with an 
estimated increase in value added of 14 percent and an increase in employment of 10 percent. 
The ME’s sectoral promotion program and the Environmental Audit Program also showed 
positive and statistically significant impacts on firm performance. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the many SME policies and programs 
in Mexico. The work presented in this section is unique, since information on SME program 
budget and beneficiaries is not easily available. Section 3 reviews existing evaluations in 
Mexico. The evaluations reviewed here are not exhaustive, but they do provide an overview  
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of past evaluations of SME programs. Section 4 presents the data used in the analysis, which 
comes mainly from establishment surveys and includes information on many of the main 
programs and policies discussed in Section 2. Section 5 discusses the methodology employed 
in the paper, which follows the approached used in the regional study suitable for firm panel 
data.  Section  6  presents the results  and indicates which programs and agencies have 
improved the performance of SME programs through their interventions. Section 7 offers 
conclusions and future lines of work. 
 
2.- SME PROGRAMS 
From 2001 to 2006, the Government of Mexico invested heavily on SME support programs, 
providing about US$80 billion to about 3.7 million SME firms (Table 1). As part of this 
study, an inventory of programs supporting SMEs was undertaken, as consolidated 
information is not available publicly. The inventory tallied 151 separate programs run by 
numerous different public agencies, some with overlapping mandates and target groups. 
Although the econometric study does not attempt to evaluate the impact of all these 
programs, this section provides an overview of the goals, coverage and budgets of the main 
programs, as a contribution to assist further analysis and evaluation of Mexico’s SME 
supports.  
The development bank Nacional Financiera (Nafinsa) contributed more than half of the total 
resources to SME programs and seemed to have a significant coverage among firms. The 
Ministry of Economy (ME) comes second in terms of coverage, supporting more than one 
million firms, but providing less than 1 percent of the total SME resources. Banco Mexicano 
de Comercio Exterior (Bancomext) ranks second in terms of resources (about 43 percent of 
the total), however its programs covered less than 1 percent of the firms. The Ministry of 
Labor (Secretaría de Trabajo y Provisión Social—STPS) supports about 6 percent of SME 
firms, but with a very low budget. On the other hand, CONACyT programs had a significant 
budget but limited coverage among firms. An overview of the main characteristics of major 
SME programs in Mexico is provided below, and full analysis of the rules of operation of the 





Institution Concept 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Budget 
(Million USD) 94 150 94 91 168 185 782
Firms 70,136 86,142 142,514 286,191 299,731 N/A 884,714
Budget 
(Million USD) 1,718 3,774 5,939 8,278 10,566 13,137 43,412
Firms 90,574 230,442 353,428 429,136 562,722 877,103 2,543,405
Budget 
(Million USD) 5,512 6,993 6,177 5,423 5,392 4,952 34,449
Firms 1,628 1,807 1,202 751 533 N/A 5,921
Budget 
(Million USD) 44 64 65 107 304 393 977
Firms 150 422 480 583 917 1,146 3,698
Budget 
(Million USD) 19 14 10 10 11 11 75
Firms 60,386 35,376 26,130 33,746 33,770 36,919 226,327
Budget 
(Million USD) 7,387 10,995 12,285 13,909 16,441 18,678 79,695
Firms 222,874 354,189 523,754 750,407 897,673 915,168 3,664,065
Source: Bancomext (2006a and 2006b); Conacyt (2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007); 
Nacional Financiera (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006a and 2006b); Secretaría de Economía (2006c); 
and Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (2006).
*This table does not includes specific interventions of the institutions nor inter-institutional interventions such as
the National Guarantee System.










Nacional Financiera (Nafinsa)   
Nafinsa is Mexico’s largest development bank. Traditionally focused on large industrial 
projects with direct subsidies, in the 1990s the bank started to shift increasingly towards 
smaller firms and second-floor operations, and in 2001 it underwent a deep restructuring to 
set SME support as its top priority. Nafinsa provides credit and guarantees, training and 










2001 N/A N/A N/A 90,574 1,718 2,684
2002 54,130 83,920 92,392 230,442 3,774 5,066
2003 90,566 158,377 104,485 353,428 5,939 7,615
2004 139,599 211,191 78,346 429,136 8,278 10,309
2005 397,179 99,366 66,177 562,722 10,566 12,886
2006 643,062 166,780 67,261 877,103 13,137 15,640
Total 1,324,536 719,634 408,661 2,543,405 43,413 54,199
Source: Nacional Financiera (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006a and 2006b)
Table 2 Nafinsa: Main results 2001-2006








Ministry of Economy 
From 2000 to 2006, ME substantially increased its budget for SME support programs, from 
US$22 million to US$185 million, while coverage rose from 13,000 to 300,000 SMEs.  















Table 3 SME funds and programs from the Ministry of 
Economy: Main Results 1998-2006
Source: Secretaría de Economía (2006c).
 
In 2001, ME launched a strategy to promote SME competitiveness using four funds, which in 
2004 were merged into a single Support Fund for SMEs (Fondo PYME): 
•  Fund to Promote the Integration of Productive Chains (Fondo de Fomento a la 
Integración de Cadenas Productivas—FIDECAP) sought to encourage and 
strengthen vertical and horizontal linkages of SME with other firms through subsidies 
for productive projects, industrial infrastructure and the formation of Business 
Linking Centers (Centros de Vinculación Empresarial). From 2001 to 2006, 
FIDECAP and Fondo PYME supported 2,207 projects that benefited over 597,000 
firms, with a total investment of US$387 million. 
•  Support Fund for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (Fondo de Apoyo para las 
Micro, Pequeña y Mediana Empresas—FAMPYME) was designed to increase the 
competitiveness of SME, with support mechanisms consisting of subsidies for 
feasibility studies, training and consultancy services, as well as databanks and 
Business Linking Centers. 
•  Support Fund for Access to Finance (Fondo  de Apoyo para el Acceso al 
Financiamiento—FOAFI) and Fund for the Program of Distribution Centers in the 
United States (Fondo de Programa de Centros de Distribución en Estados Unidos—
FOCOE) were two small and short-lived funds. The former sought to facilitate access 
to finance for SME through guarantee funds and financial extension services, while 
the latter helped SMEs  export to United States through training and consultancy 
services, marketing, databanks, and other services.  
•  Sector Promotion Programs (PROSEC) of the ME provides tax breaks for firms in 
specific sectors to import certain goods used for manufacturing products approved by 
the  ministry. The imported products should be used for the production of goods 
regardless of whether they are intended for the internal or external markets.   
6 
 
When all of these funds consolidated, Fondo PYME kept most of their support mechanisms, 
within a single,  less complicated operational scheme. Between 2001 and 2006, the total 
resources allocated to these funds rose from US$41  million to US$205 million, and the 













FAMPYME 25,692 25 21,141 23 12,745 15 59,578 63
FIDECAP 36,342 16 23,107 60 24,594 125 84,043 201
FOAFI * * 23,362 15 48,917 18 72,279 33
FACOE * * * * 6,606 7 6,606 7
Total 62,034 41 67,610 98 92,862 165 222,506 304
Fondo PYME 177,393 105 130,281 168 165,937 205 473,611 478
* The fund did not exist in the specified year.
Source: Secretaría de Economía (2006a).
2001 2002 2003 Total
Total




ME  manages  other programs  related to SME support,  such as the National System of 
Business Incubators, which had a total of 308 institutions supporting firms, and the Program 
of Training and Modernization (Programa de Capacitación y Apoyo Empresarial—
PROMODE) to increase the competitiveness of small retailers. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Workers trained 91,240 176,506 146,142 156,014 192,875 94,431 857,208
Entrepreneurs trained 9,012 16,907 12,562 6,170 12,581 9,644 66,876
Instructors trained 2,593 1,512 1,492 1,246 1,433 404 8,680
Total individuals trained 102,845 194,925 160,196 163,430 206,889 104,479 932,764
Total SME benefited N/A N/A 16,528 18,889 17,691 19,113 72,221
Table 5 PROMODE: Main Results 2001-2006
* Data from 2001 to June 2006.
Source: Secretaría de Economía (2007c)  
Another program run by ME is the Network of Centers for the Development of Business 
Competitiveness and Regional Centers for Business Competitiveness (CETRO-CRECE). 
This was created in 1996 to support Mexican SMEs development by identifying their needs 
and offering them the appropriate tools to become competitive. During its first years 
CETRO-CRECE was entirely financed with federal funds. However, by 2003, its financial 
structure had changed to 59 percent federal subsidies, 30 percent from clients, 8 percent from 
other private entities and 3 percent from state and municipal governments. It is the largest 
institution in Mexico offering  consultancy services and training. Other types of support 
mechanisms the network provides include  elaboration of feasibility studies, marketing 
strategies, sector and financial analyses, human resource studies, analysis and oversight of 
the productive process, management analysis and oversight,  and  business training. The 
CETRO-CRECE network supported 29,466 firms between 2001 and 2003 and the budget for 
the network during that period was 625.9 million pesos.  
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Lastly, ME runs the National Committee for Productivity and Technological Innovation 
(Comité Nacional de Productividad e Innovación Tecnológica—COMPITE), which provides 
SME consulting and training services. The objective of the program is to help SME to be 
more competitive by increasing productivity and improving quality. COMPITE consultants 
use best-practice business development and management models to improve the management 
of firms. Between 2001 and 2006, COMPITE supported close to 50,000 firms, which had to 
pay part of the cost of the services. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Services 12,949 13,226 14,192 12,512 16,901 1,338 71,118
SME 6,585 8,550 10,184 9,168 13,746 778 49,011
Hours 82,804 76,003 204,450 238,912 291,097 28,426 921,692
Participants 42,005 35,394 62,876 57,195 65,881 14,390 277,741
SME with ISO 9000 
certifications 307 238 277 227 257 195 1,501
Table 6 COMPITE: Main Results 2001-2006
* Data from 2001 to June 2006.
Source: Secretaría de Economía (2007c)  
Bancomext 
Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior (Bancomext) is the country’s export-import 
development bank. Bancomext supports the participation of Mexican firms in global markets, 
providing financing, training and technical assistance. Bancomext targets SMEs with export 
sales  of  up to US$20 million per year. The bank’s major support mechanism is direct 
medium and long-term credit to exporting firms. In addition, the bank offers direct and 
Internet-based information services about foreign markets and exporting procedures and 
requirements for Mexican firms. The bank also promotes the participation of Mexican SMEs 





2001 4,893 619 5,512 1,628 1,716
2002 5,442 1,551 6,993 1,807 1,866
2003 5,435 742 6,177 1,202 1,257
2004 4,986 437 5,423 751 826
2005 5,254 138 5,392 533 584
2006 4,865 87 4,952 N/A N/A
Total 30,875 3,574 34,449 5,921 6,249
Firms benefited Resources mobilized (million USD)
Year
Table 7 Bancomext: Main Results 2001-2006
Source: Bancomext (2006a and 2006b)  
Bancomext has two main programs: Crediexporta and the Technical Assistance Program 
(Programa de Asistencia Técnica—PAT). Crediexporta  is Bancomext’s  most important 
financing program mainly targeted to SMEs. The program has five different modalities: (i)  
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working capital, (ii) investment projects; (iii) buyer loans; (iv) guarantees; and (v) credit 
letters (a guarantee payment instrument).  
PAT subsidizes 50 percent of the cost of specialized consulting and technical services to help 
SMEs improve productivity and competitiveness in foreign markets. Some of the specific 
areas supported by the programs were international certifications, promotion materials, 
export business plans, and promotional campaigns abroad. From 2001 to 2005, the PAT 
channeled over US$9 million to more than 7,000 firms, supporting exports of about US$500 
million. However, the budget of the program decreased from US$1 million to less than 
US$100,000 between 2001 and 2005, and coverage dropped from 3,000 to 835 firms over the 
same period.  
CONACyT 
CONACyT is a decentralized agency of the federal government responsible for science and 
technology policies. The agency is in charge of promoting the accumulation of scientific 
development and technological modernization through human resources, the support of 
specific research projects and the diffusion of information about science and technology. 
Between 2001 and 2006, CONACyT implemented several programs to boost technological 
capabilities of Mexican firms: 1) the Technological Modernization Program (Programa de 
Modernización Tecnológica—PMT);  2) the Science and Technology Sectoral Fund for 
Economic  Development;  3) the High Value-Added in Businesses with Knowledge and 
Entrepreneurs program (Alto Valor Agregado en Negocios con Conocimiento y 
Empresarios—AVANCE);  4)  Mixed Funds Program;  5) the Knowledge and Innovation 
Program (Programa de Conocimiento e  Innovación—PCI); 6)  the  Support Research and 
Development in Projects Program  (Programa de Apoyo a Proyectos  de Investigación y 
Desarrollo Conjuntos—PAIDEC); and 7) the fiscal incentives program. These programs are 
detailed below. 
The PMT was established in 2001 to provide fiscal credits up to 30 percent per year for firms 
that made investment in research and development. From 2001 to 2006, PMT’s coverage 
increased from 90 to 738 firms. In 2006, the program’s budget was US$873 million, of which 













2001 60 315 32 90 233 13 150 548 44
2002 76 429 36 125 358 16 201 787 51
2003 102 508 30 143 150 16 245 658 46
2004 132 N/A N/A 225 N/A N/A 357 1,308 89
2005 202 N/A N/A 411 N/A N/A 613 2,083 275
2006 316 N/A N/A 738 N/A N/A 1,054 3,317 367
Total 889 N/A N/A 1,731 N/A N/A 2,620 8,701 873
Table 8 Fiscal Incentives: Main Results 2001-2006
Large firms SME Total
Source: Conacyt (2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007)   
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In 2002, CONACyT  and  ME  created the Science and Technology Sectoral Fund for 
Economic Development to support  technological innovation in products, materials and 
manufacturing processes. The fund supported firms in a variety of sectors with subsidies 
worth US$60 million to 911 firms from 2002 to 2005. Data are not available on the size of 





Support from the 
Fund (million USD)
2002 221 270 13
2003 235 151 19
2004 197 126 11
2005 258 159 16
Total 911 706 59
Table 9 Science and Technology Sectoral Fund: Main Results 2002-2006
Source: Conacyt (2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007)  
In 2003, CONACyT  created the AVANCE  program  as a means to identify business 
opportunities and promote firms based on scientific or technological developments. Although 
small in size and resources, AVANCE has nine modalities: New Businesses, 
Entrepreneurship Fund CONACyT-Nafinsa, Guarantee Fund, Patent Support, Technological 
Packages, Technology Transfer Offices, AVANCE Business Schools, Strategic Alliances and 
Innovation Networks for Competitiveness, and Seed Capital. AVANCE’s coverage of SMEs 
increased from 29 firms in 2004 to 92 firms in 2006, with program resources growing from 











2004 29 7 2 0.7 31 8
2005 46 13 2 0.8 48 14
2006 92 26 2 0.8 94 27
Total 167 47 6 2.4 173 49
Source: CONACYT (2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007)
Table 10 AVANCE: Main Results 2004-2006
 
Mixed funds are instruments to support scientific and technological development in states 
and municipalities through trusts that are constituted with resources from the three tiers of 
government. These funds are promoted by an open national competition scheme and the 
selection is based on merit and quality. Categories  include: (i) applied research;  (ii) 
technological development;  (iii) reinforcement of infrastructure;  (iv) dissemination;  (v) 
creation and consolidation of research groups and networks; and (vi) comprehensive projects. 
PCI started its operations in 1998 with a budget of approximately US$500 million for 1999-
2003. Of these resources, 61 percent was for supporting science, 17 percent for technology 
and 22 percent to establish linkages. The PCI contributed with 40 percent of the resources 
and the World Bank financed the rest. Its objectives were to promote Mexico’s science and  
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technology system, to strengthen links between participants in the national innovation and to 
contribute to improved productivity, competitiveness and economic growth.  
PAIDEC was created to improve  cooperation between firms and institutions of higher 
education by encouraging firms to use available knowledge in research and industrial 
development projects. Eligible research projects included: applied research, design and 
development of products and processes and development, and adaptation and improvement 
of existing technologies. CONACyT granted up to 50 percent of financial support to research 
projects, with a limit of US$250,000. Resources could be used for raw materials, consultancy 
services, training, project-related travel, equipment for the project (with a maximum of 15 
percent of total resources), salaries of researchers and technicians who participated in project 
patents, and acquisition of literature and databases. 
The fiscal incentives program of CONACyT was directed towards taxpaying firms that have 
invested in research projects and technology development in order to develop new projects, 
materials and processes. The main objective of this program was to increase the annual 
investment and spending of firms on those three items by allowing firms to recover up to 30 
percent of their annual investment. 
STPS 
In 1998, Mexico launched the Integral Quality and Modernization Program (CIMO), which 
was mainly an in-firm training program. The program was implemented and administered by 
the STPS. In 2002, the program was decentralized to the states under a new name, Training 
Support Program (PAC). The program provides subsidies to training and technical assistance 
to SMEs in order to enhance their productivity and welfare of workers. In 2009, PAC 
changed once again its design, and was rename the Productivity Support Program (PAP). 
Micro Small Medium Total
2001 333,474 47,705 7,911 4,770 60,386 19
2002 201,233 27,947 4,634 2,795 35,376 14
2003 210,746 26,130 0 0 26,130 10
2004 299,656 23,622 6,547 3,577 33,746 10
2005 279,725 11,620 12,222 9,928 33,770 11
2006 265,041 17,090 10,585 9,244 36,919 11
Total 1,589,875 154,114 41,899 30,314 226,327 75
Source: Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (2006)




Table 11 CIMO-PAC: Main Results 2001-2006
 
From 2001 to 2006, CIMO-PAC trained about 1.6 million workers, benefiting more than 
226,000 firms with an estimated annual budget of about US$11 million. The precise number 
of workers and firms which benefited from the program is not clear since they could apply 
several times to receive the courses and the subsidies. Table 11 shows one trend worth noting 
is that PAC sought a decline in their coverage of workers (21 percent), firms (39 percent) as 
well as resources (29 percent).   
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Programs by Other Ministries and Agencies 
Two notable SME-related programs run by other agencies include the National 
Environmental Audit Program (Programa Nacional de Auditoría Ambiental—PNAA) and  
the Labor Qualification Certification Council (Consejo de Normalización de Competencias 
Laborales—CONOCER).  
PNAA was created in 1992 under the supervision of the Federal Environmental Protection 
Attorney (Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente—PROFEPA). This voluntary 
certification program promotes environmental audits in firms in order to acquire knowledge 
about how their operations generate pollution, and environmental risks, and how they could 
comply with environmental regulations and apply best-practices.  The program aims to 
improve the impact of firms on the environment and generate savings through a more 
efficient use of raw materials and other inputs. At the end of the environmental audit, the 
firm signs an agreement including an action plan with the main activities and the time needed 
to  make  its processes more environmentally friendly. Between 2000 and 2006, PNAA 
initiated 4,147 audits, signed 2,285 action plans, initiated 7,390 investments, and granted 
1,773 “clean industry” certificates.  
CONOCER is an organization under the Ministry of Education (SEP) that certifies labor 
skills. It is made up of workers, businessmen, educators, trainers and federal government 
representatives. CONOCER promotes workers’  development through the evaluation and 
certification of their knowledge, abilities and skills. The main objective of CONOCER is the 
development and promotion of a skills certification in order to establish general guidelines 
and define technical rules related to labor skills. CONOCER offers three types of support 
mechanisms: (i) technical rules for  labor  skills, (ii) evaluation  instruments, and (iii) 
certification processes. 
Summary and Overview of Mexico’s SME Programs 
In sum, from 2001 to 2006 there was an important increase in public resources to support 
SME programs. During this period, agencies and programs increased considerably their 
coverage. Examples of such increase and expansion of programs include ME, CONACyT, 
Nafinsa. However, other ministries sought their SME resources decline in the same period, 
for reasons that are not entirely clear. One possible explanation is that STPS programs were 
decentralized to the states in 2001, thus reducing the federal fiscal burden.  
As is immediately apparent from this overview, Mexico has a huge array of programs 
involved in supporting SMEs in some way. This in itself is an important finding, and 
suggests that Mexico would do well to design a more coherent framework to orient resources 
more efficiently and strategically, and avoid program overlap. As well, the lack of easily 
available information on program budgets, activities and beneficiaries points to a need for 
improved consolidation of information on SME support, to improve the ability of 
policymakers to make evaluations and comparisons, and ensure that the country’s scarce 
fiscal resources are achieving the greatest possible impact. Among the various topics these 
programs address are the following categories (Table 12): (i) technical assistance and training 
(TAT); (ii) modernization, innovation and technical development (MITD); (iii) knowledge  
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and information exchange (KIE); (iv) fiscal incentives (FI); (v) financial products (FP); (vi) 
business promotion and opportunities (BPO); and (vii) other types of support (O). Because 
most programs have  a broad set of objectives and types of support mechanisms, most 
programs fall in more than one category.  This is important to bear in mind when discussing 
the evaluation strategy of this paper, and was an important factor in choosing to evaluate 




There are a few rigorous program evaluations of SME programs in Mexico. Most evaluations 
have focused on client satisfaction or program outcomes, such as the number of supports 
given to beneficiaries. The variations in methodologies have made the comparison of results 
between and within programs difficult. Several external evaluations of SME programs have 
been undertaken, with the evaluation methodology as agreed upon by the supervising body 
and the external evaluators.  For example, for FAMPYME and FIDECAP, the Ministry of the 
Economy hired the National Polytechnic Institute (Instituto Politécnico Nacional—IPN) and 
 
                                                           
2 World Bank (2007) includes a detailed review of evaluations of SME programs in Mexico. 
Table 12 Programs and support mechanisms 
Program  TAT  MITD  KIE  FI  FP  BPO  O 
CIMO-PAC  x             
FIDECAP  x  x        X   
FAMPYME  x  x  x    x    X 
Fondo PYME  x  x  x    x  X  X 
CETRO-
CRECE 
x          X  X 
COMPITE  x             
PROSEC        x       
PROMODE  x  x        X   
PAT  x             
CrediExporta          x     
PNAA              X 
Sector Funds    x           
Mixed Funds    x           
PMT  x  x           
PCI    x  x         
PAIDEC    x  x         
Fiscal 
Incentives 
  x    x       
CONOCER              X 
Source: Authors’ compilations  
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the Economic Administrative and Social Research Center.  For the evaluation of CETRO-
CRECE,  the Ministry of the Economy  commissioned the Institute of Engineering at the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico (Instituto de Ingenieria de la Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México—IIUNAM).  
Past program evaluations have varied considerably in design and methodology, in part due to 
vague legal requirements concerning the type of evaluation required.  The evaluation 
methodologies  used can be categorized into three main groups in order of the statistical 
rigorousness of their designs  (Table 13):  a) non-experimental evaluations  (CIMO-PAC, 
CONOCER, and a recent terms of reference for Fondo PYME); b) operational evaluations 
(CRECE, FIDECAP, FAMPYME, and PAT); and c) case studies (PMT, PAIDEC and 
COMPITE).  








Type of Analysis 
CIMO  STPS  STPS  1995, 1997 
Comparison with match 
firms 
CIMO  STPS  Alduncín y Asociados  2002 












Comparison with match 
firms 
Comparison with match 
firms 
COMPITE  SE 
Lateral Investment Fund from 
IDB* 
2003 
Recipient views of program 
impact 
CRECE  SE  IILUNAM  2003 
Recipient views of program 
impact  
FIDECAP  SE  IPN  2003 
Recipient views of program 
impact 
FAMPYME  SE  IPN  2003 
Recipient views of program 
impact 
PMT  CONACyT  CONACyT  2000 
Recipient views of program 
impact 
PAT  BANCOMEXT  BANCOMEXT  2000 




PAIDEC  CONACyT  CONACyT  2000 
Recipient views of program 
impact 
*IDB—Inter-American Development Bank.  
Early Program Evaluations 
All four evaluations of CIMO-PAC (1995, 1997, 2002, 2005) and the CONOCER evaluation 
can be characterized as non-experimental by their use of an ex-post matching to form 
comparison groups in order to isolate the causal impact of program participation.  In all cases 
except CIMO-PAC’s 2002 evaluation, random sampling was unnecessary because the 
universe of firms or workers meeting evaluation criteria were so few.  
In the 1995 and 1997 evaluations of CIMO, the control group was made up of 316 firms from 
the economic census that shared size, sector and location characteristics with those of the 
pilot treatment group.  The treatment group consisted of all firms that entered the program in 
1991 and 1992 and remained registered in 1993.  Though 442 firms met these criteria, only 
248 contained the necessary information for evaluation.  This may have led to selection bias, 
because only the best-managed firms who kept organized records were used in the 
evaluations.  This in turn could have led to overestimates of the effectiveness of the program.  
Similarly, the control group used in the CONOCER evaluation was selected from the same 
sectors of activity and region as the treatment group, with the intention of matching firm 
characteristics.  The treatment group consisted of firms of those sectors and regions in which 
the greatest number of labor competency certificates had been issued. The group was selected 
as such because in 2001 only a few sectors had completed the cycle of supports provided by 
CONOCER.  
In  the  CIMO-PAC 1995 evaluation,  a series of regressions were run on productivity, 
employment and wages using dummy variables to isolate the effect of the program by sector, 
type of support and firm size.  The CIMO-PAC 1997 analysis incorporated regression based 
on a Cobb-Douglas production function. In the case of CIMO-PAC 2002 evaluation, the 
analysis consisted of comparing the percentages of responses of the survey questions 
between the treatment and control groups. Cost benefit studies were also carried out in the 
CIMO-PAC evaluation (1995 and 1997).  In each case the treatment and control groups were 
compared based on the unit cost per unit impact.  Cost benefit indices were calculated based 
on impact measures divided by private and public costs associated with the program. 
The evaluations produced mixed results in relation to program  outcome and impact 
objectives.  Some programs seemed to have more impact than others, and notable differences 
were found in the impact of firms of different sizes and in different sectors. For instance, the 
CIMO-PAC (1995) evaluation concluded that the treatment group’s employment increased 
8.5 percent while the control decreased 1 percent between 1991 and 1993. The CIMO-PAC 
(2002) evaluation concluded that while 16.5 percent of the treatment group’s sales were 
exported, the control group firms only exported 9.7 percent of their sales over the same 
period. The CONOCER evaluation found large differences in outcome indicators between 
certified and non-certified workers in the forestry and textile industries, but the differences  
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were almost insignificant in the tourism industry. Thus, program performance may be tied to 
size and sector differences—an issue that should be the subject of further study. 
Evaluations of both CIMO-PAC and CONOCER administered questionnaires to 
beneficiaries and members of the control group. CIMO-PAC questionnaires collected 
quantitative information on personnel, payroll, training, fixed assets, and inventories, as well 
as qualitative information on productive characteristics of the firms, market, organization, 
employment, remunerations, and training.  The CONOCER questionnaires gathered socio-
demographic characteristics, work experience and on-the job training for workers, as well as 
quantitative data on the production and employment of beneficiaries. For workers, the 
evaluation focused on gathering indicators related to the objectives of the program such as 
increases in certification of labor competencies, wages, job-mobility, increased skills, 
reduced turnover and improved working conditions.  They also collected qualitative data 
with regards to business performance, human resource management and labor competition.  
The qualitative surveys of CIMO and CONOCER indicated that most beneficiaries are in 
general satisfied with the programs. However, these results differ between firms of different 
sizes and firms within different sectors. Medium-sized  enterprises  tend to be  the most 
satisfied, while small and micro firms perceive that the program supports are insufficient. For 
instance, in the CIMO-PAC (1997) evaluation it was noted that while the benefits of the 
supports outweighed the costs for medium-sized enterprises, costs outweighed benefits for 
small and micro firms.   
Evaluations of FIDECAP (2003) and FAMPYME (2003)  also surveyed beneficiaries to 
assess the impact of the programs. Only 40 percent of FIDECAP firms said the program 
resources influenced their performance. The FAMPYME  evaluation concluded that 
beneficiaries were indifferent in their view of whether the program increased employment 
and production growth. 
Panel Evaluations 
Tan and Lopez-Acevedo (2005) used panel data (1991-1996) collected by the Ministry of 
Labor on two cohorts of CIMO participants and a control group, to evaluate more rigorously 
the net impacts of CIMO on SME performance. Two previous evaluations of CIMO by the 
STPS  found seemingly contradictory results:  evidence of improvements in intermediate 
outputs (worker training, production processes and adoption of quality control) but no or 
negative impacts on productivity. While these findings may simply reflect poor design and 
implementation, they may also be the result of self-selection of low-productivity SMEs into 
the program. The authors tested this hypothesis using difference in difference methods (DID) 
to remove pre-intervention productivity differences between groups, and found a sign 
reversal of the program impact coefficient, with CIMO participants now enjoying a 6-11 
percent net performance gain in the 1994 to 1996 period. In a second Mexico study, Tan and 
Lopez-Acevedo (2007) evaluated CIMO, CRECE and COMPITE using three rounds of 
enterprise surveys (ENESTYC 1995, 1999 and 2001) with information on program 
participation linked to annual panel industry surveys fielded by INEGI. These data were used 
to identify different cohorts of the treatment and control groups matched on propensity scores 
of pre-program attributes.  All three programs showed net gains on intermediate outcomes  
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such as training, adoption of new technology and use of quality control methods. While 
improvements in these intermediate outcomes  were supposed to translate into improved 
performance, the authors did not find statistically significant net gains in wages, export 
orientation or productivity. The authors concluded that greater attention to differential 
treatment “doses”—for example, more versus less training or type of consulting services 
provided—larger sample sizes, and tracking beneficiaries over a longer horizon  may be 
needed to determine whether these interventions have the hypothesized positive performance 
impacts. 
Evaluations in progress 
With respect to Fondo PYME, in 2009 a team from the Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey 
(Mexico City campus)  carried out the first evaluation that included  aspects of design, 
processes, perceptions and impacts (ITESM-CCM 2009). The evaluation assessed the fund’s 
capacity to create and maintain formal firms and formal jobs, as well as its potential to 
increase productivity and sales for established firms, using a methodology based on data 
envelopment analysis. The study found positive impacts on the productivity of beneficiary 
firms of about 4 percent on average one year after treatment with respect to non-beneficiary 
control firms. Business incubators, business accelerators, supplier development, productive 
projects and seed capital were the support mechanisms with greater impact on productivity, 
in some case with more than 10 percent. Fondo PYME also showed positive impacts on sales 
of about US$19,000 in the year following treatment. The evaluation should be taken with 
reservation because of possible biases due to self-selection and unobserved firm 
heterogeneity that could have contributed to the positive results. As shown in Section 4, these 
biases could lead to over-estimating the impact of SME programs.  
Summing up 
There are wide variations in evaluation design and methodology,  and  few  programs in 
Mexico have had impact evaluations, hindering the comparison of programs on the basis of 
their effectiveness and efficiency. Most of the evaluations have been quantitative, and in 
those cases with impact evaluations there had been some doubts about the quality of the 
control group and the methodology. The most rigorous impact evaluation is by Tan and 
Lopez (2005), but it was limited by small sample sizes and by the lack of more rounds of the 
panel in order to assess the effects of the interventions over a longer time span. The present 
analysis represents an improvement over the previous impact evaluation study in terms of the 
methodology and the information used. First, the present research uses a yearly panel over 
ten years, which provides more continuous information about entry and exit of firms. As 
well, a larger sample of firms participating in SME programs is available from the last round 
of the ENESTYC 2005 survey. Finally, a bounding methodology applied in the panel data 
allowed for testing the robustness of the impacts of programs to firm exit. 
 
4.- DATA 
The paper uses the  National Employment Salary, Training and Technology (Encuesta 
Nacional de Empleo, Salarios, Capacitación y Tecnología—ENESTYC)  and  Annual  
17 
 
Industry Survey (Encuesta Industrial Annual—EIA) surveys maintained by INEGI to create 
the non-experimental panel dataset. The ENESTYC periodically  surveys  manufacturing 
firms with sample sizes of between 5,000 and 8,000 establishments, fielded in 1995, 1999, 
2001 and 2005. In 2001  and 2005, the ENESTYC included a module of questions on 
participation in major government SME support programs. In 2005, INEGI also fielded a 
Micro-ENESTYC survey with greatly expanded coverage of micro and small enterprises. 
The EIA is the annual manufacturing survey fielded by INEGI, and a linked panel of 
establishments can be created over the 1992-2006 period from the annual surveys. Our 
strategy was to link the 2001 and 2005 ENESTYC to the 1994-2005 EIA to exploit the 
availability of annual panel data in that survey.  
The ENESTYC uses the same sampling frame as the annual EIA, that is a stratified random 
sample by 54 sectors and four size categories—micro with 1-15 employees, small with 16-
100, medium with 101-250 and large with over 250 employees. The sample size of each 
ENESTYC survey is fairly large, varying from 5,000 establishments in 1995 to 7,500 
establishments in the 2005 ENESTYC.  However, because ENESTYC was never designed to 
be a panel survey and smaller firms in each survey were randomly sampled, only a small 
proportion of SMEs can be tracked over time.  Few micro enterprises can be linked over time 
in the ENESTYC, but sample sizes for the panel of small and medium enterprises should be 
adequate for the proposed analyses (Table 14).   








Micro (1 – 15)  2  54   10 
Small (16 – 100)  161  335   192 
Medium (101 – 250)  723  1,273  1,192  
Large (251 - +)  954  1,404  1,244  
Total  1,840  3,066  2,638  
Source: Research team estimates from ENESTYC surveys. 
The 2001 ENESTYC surveys included, for the first time, questions about familiarity with 
and participation in a list of major government-sponsored SME programs, including date of 
participation, duration, and type of services used.  This module was repeated in the 2005 
ENESTYC survey. In both surveys, firms could indicate participation in one or more 
programs.  The 2005 ENESTYC dropped several SME programs that had since ceased 
operation, and included a number of other SME initiatives introduced since 2001.   
The authors worked with INEGI  on linking establishments from the 2001 and 2005 
ENESTYC with earlier ENESTYC surveys, and with the panel EIA covering the 1992-2006 
period.  INEGI linked the EIA and the 2001 and 2005 ENESTYC that generated a panel EIA 
dataset for the sample of enterprises that report information on program participation in the  
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ENESTYC 2001 and 2005, and dates of participation if any. The ENESTYC and EIA were 
linked through an identification code constructed by INEGI. This dataset provides 
information on the treatment for the years before the intervention and after the intervention.  
The ENESTYC-EIA panel is conformed of near 2,600 firms, of which around 1,600 firms 
reported having participated in one or more programs (the treatment group) and 1,000 stated 
that they had never participated in any programs (the control group). CIMO-PAC, the 
CONACyT program and the environment program were the three most commonly used by 
firms  in the treatment group (Table 15).  Firms are characterized as  either  currently 
participating in a program or having participated in the past, with the former category having 
more respondents.  












in the Past 
CIMO  282  10.96  142  140 
COMPITE  60  2.33  23  37 
CRECE  38  1.48  16  22 
FIDECAP  8  0.31  6  2 
FAMPYME  10  0.39  6  4 
MEX-EX  36  1.40  18  18 
PATCI  10  0.39  4  6 
PMT  20  0.78  10  10 
PCI  8  0.31  6  2 
PAIDEC  13  0.51  9  4 
Fondo Pyme  27  1.05  13  14 
PROMODE  9  0.35  3  6 
PROSEC  113  4.39  88  25 
Mixed or Sectoral Funds  36  1.40  23  13 
Productive Chains  47  1.83  33  14 
Financing  39  1.52  23  16 
Crediexporta  47  1.83  28  19 
PAT  44  1.71  31  13 
PNAA  247  9.60  189  58 
Fiscal Support and 
Technological 
Innovation   187  7.27  124  63 
State Government 




Support   37  1.44  29  8 
Other   100  3.89  75  25 
Source:  Linked ENESTYC-EIA panel data.       
 
The paper analyzes the SME programs that yielded the larger sample sizes. The programs 
are:   
1) PAC-CIMO, included both in the ENESTYC 2001 and in the ENESTYC 2005 Surveys.  
2) PROSEC, only recorded in the ENESTYC 2005.  
3) PNAA, only recorded in the ENESTYC 2005.  
4) Fiscal Support and Technological Innovation, only recorded in the ENESTYC 2005.   
5) State government support, only recorded in the ENESTYC 2005.  
6) Any program, referring to any program in the program module of the ENESTYC 2001 and 
of the ENESTYC 2005, as follows:  
ENESTYC 2001 and 2005: COMPITE, CRECE, FIDECAP and FAMPYME.  
ENESTYC 2001:  MEX-EX (México Exporta), Technical Assistance and Image 
Campaign Program (Programa de Asistencia Técnica y Campaña de Imagen—
PATCI), PMT, PCI, and PAIDEC.  
ENESTYC 2005: Fondo PYME, PROMODE, Mixed or Sectoral Funds, Productive 
Chains, Financing, Crediexporta, PAT, Municipal Government Support, and other 
programs. 
The objective was to explore the impact of several programs in groups by agency, and to 
analyze programs individually when data allowed, as follows:
3
1)  All  STPS  programs (CIMO-PAC), which include training, BDS, and productivity 
programs.  
 
2)  ME, which includes FIDECAP, FAMPYME, Fondo PYME, COMPITE, CRECE, 
PROMODE and PROSEC.  
3) BANCOMEXT, which includes MEX-EX, PATCI, Crediexporta and PAT.  
4) CONACyT includes PMT, PCI, PAIDEC, Fiscal Support and Technological Innovation 
and Mixed or Sectoral Funds.  
                                                           
3 The other option of grouping by type of program (training, technology upgrade, etc.) was not possible in Mexico, 
since most programs belong encompass more than one type of intervention (Table 12).   
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5) Other Agency includes Nafinsa, Productive Chains, Financing, PNAA, State Government 
Support, Municipal Government Support, and Others.  
Out of 30,199 year-firm observations, 18,435 are for the control group that reported never 
having participated in any SME programs, and 11,764 are for firms in the treatment group 
(Table 16).  The last two columns refer to the treatment group with year-of-first-participation 
information, which was used to define a post-program indicator variable with a value of 0 for 
all years prior to the first-year-of-participation and a value of 1 for the first year of 
participation and all subsequent years.  
Table 16. Distribution of Treatment and Control Groups 
   Total   Group    
Treatment Group with Program Start 
Dates 
Year  Sample  Control   Treatment  Pre-program  Post-program 
1994  2,440  1,488  952  874  78 
1995  2,444  1,490  954  851  103 
1996  2,465  1,505  960  837  123 
1997  2,495  1,524  971  819  152 
1998  2,511  1,532  979  763  216 
1999  2,522  1,539  983  642  341 
2000  2,528  1,544  984  427  557 
2001  2,534  1,548  986  331  655 
2002  2,541  1,552  989  266  723 
2003  2,573  1,571  1,002  185  817 
2004  2,573  1,571  1,002  9  993 
2005  2,573  1,571  1,002  0  1,002 
Total  30,199  18,435  11,764  6,004  5,760 
   Source:  Linked ENESTYC-EIA panel data. 
The treatment group and the control group increase with the size of the firm (Table 17). Firm 
size is defined as “micro” with 15 or fewer workers, “small” with 16 to 100 workers, 
“medium” with 101 to 250 workers, and “large” with over 250 workers.  
Table 17. Distribution of Treatment and Control Groups by Firm Size and Sector 
Sector  Micro  Small  Medium  Large 
   Treat  Control  Treat  Control  Treat  Control  Treat  Control 
Food, beverages and tobacco  1  3  22  44  81  101  154  171 
Textile industry, clothing and 
leather industry  0  1  8  31  56  107  62  82 
Wood products  0  0  1  7  11  22  12  15 
Paper products  0  0  1  9  31  71  25  55 
Chemical  0  1  27  56  84  138  93  139 
Mineral products  0  2  10  21  24  38  21  40 
Basic metalic industry  0  0  1  8  8  21  19  22 
Metalic products, machinery 




industries  0  0  1  0  3  2  6  8 
Total  1  11  89  237  391  635  508  669 
Source: Linked ENESTYC-EIA panel data. 
Note: Firm size is defined as follows:  micro with 1-15 workers, small with 16-100 workers, 
    medium with 101-250 workers and large with over 250 workers. 
 
Considering  the distributions presented in Table 17,  selecting a control group based on 
observable attributes such as sector and size is likely to be inadequate. Even with similar 
sector-size distributions, the treatment and control groups can have very different pre-
program values of sales, productivity or wages.   
The EIA panel contains annual data on measures of firm performance such as sales, gross 
value of production, employment, total compensation, and income from exports, as well as 
some intermediate outputs that the programs may affect,  such as technology transfers. 
Comparing the means for the key outcome measures of the treatment and control groups, 
several points emerge (Table 18).
4
Table 18. Differences in Means Between the Treatment and the Control Group, Any Program 
 First, there are statistically significant difference in means 
between the treatment and the control group for wages, employment, and worked hours, 
suggesting that the treatment group was doing fairly well.  Second, these differences are 
similar before and after the treatment, meaning that the programs were not having additional 
effect on the performance of firms. This conjecture is analyzed further in the next section, 
which estimates the impact of programs controlling for selection biases. 
  
Year When Program 
Starts (t-0)    




Means  t-test    
Difference in 
Means  t-test 
Employment  95  **  3.84    100  **  3.89 
Worked hours  217  **  3.65    240  **  3.79 
Wages  16,389  **  3.11    18,388  **  3.37 
Gross production  78,708     0.72    99,553     0.81 
Inputs  73,491     1.01    78,533     0.99 
Value added  5,216     0.12    21,020     0.41 
Fixed assets  -167,693  **  -5.56    -144,686  **  -3.89 
Domestic sales  64,334  *  1.66    52,902     1.16 
Foreign sales  34,052     0.44    56,737     0.72 
Total sales  98,386     0.99    109,639     1.01 
Technology transfers payments  -712     -0.35    107     0.07 
Technology transfer income  -30     -0.18    -46     -0.19 
Maquila services expenditures  -372     -0.54    -844     -1.17 
Maquila services incomes  4,215  *  1.77     4,638     1.46 
Source: Linked ENESTYC-EIA panel data. 
Notes:     (1) Monetary variables are in real 2005 pesos. 
(2) * and ** denote significant differences at 10% and 5% level, respectively. 
                                                           





5.1 Selection biases 
Consider a general model for firm i in time t which relates outcomes Y  to observable firm 
attributes  X  and an indicator variable for participation in a program D: 
  it it t it it D X Y ε α β + + =              (1) 
  it i it u v + = ε  
where  ε   is made up of a time-invariant firm-specific component v  and a randomly 
distributed error term u . If firms are randomly assigned to the treatment and control groups, 
then the treatment and the control groups have similar distributions of the non-observed 
attributes.  In this case, OLS can be used to estimate (1) from post-program cross-sectional 
data to get an unbiased measure of α , the net effect of the program.  
The challenge is to estimate the net impacts of program participation α  free of bias from 
self-selection of firms into programs based on their observable and unobservable productivity 
attributes. To see this, rewrite (1) separately for the treatment and control groups and 
difference the two equations to get an expression for α  as in (2): 
) 1 ( ] 1 , [
1 1 1 = + + = = D E X D X Y E it it it it ε α β                   (2)   
) 0 ( ] 0 , [
0 0 0 = + = = D E X D X Y E it it it it ε β    
 
) 0 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ] 0 , [ ] 1 , [
0 1 0 0 1 1 = − = + + − = = − = D E D E X X D X Y E D X Y E it it it it it it it it ε ε α β    
The differenced equation in (2) identifies two potential sources of bias from non-random 
assignment, one due to differences between groups in observed attributes  X ,  ) (
0 1
it it X X −
another due to differences in the non-observed attributes u ,  ) ( ) ( 0 1 i i u E u E ≠ . The first source 
of bias can be minimized by careful matching of the control group to the treatment group in 
terms of observables  X .  However, the second source of bias due to u remains. One partial 
solution is to include a lot of observable variables that are correlated with the outcome of 
interest. This reduces the residual variance, and allows one to determine how much selection 
on unobservables there would have to be in order to overturn the direction of program impact 
obtained when assuming selection on observables (Altonji, Elder and Taber, 2005).  
Evaluation studies sought to address these potential selection biases through the combined 
use of propensity score matching and difference in difference (DID) methods. This paper 
uses similar methods to accommodate the specific nature of our panel data,  which  is 
discussed below.   
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Recent studies have matched the treatment and control groups on the basis of a propensity 
score. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) define the propensity score as the probability of 
receiving a treatment conditional on a vector of observed covariates. They showed that 
propensity score eliminates the bias due to observed covariates.  
Propensity score matching may not be enough if self-selection into programs is also based on 
productivity attributes not observable to the analyst.  The presence of unobserved attributes 
v can thus bias estimates of α , even yielding negative program impacts. 
The confounding effects of v on α  can be addressed through DID methods. Let  0 = t  and 
1 = t  represent the pre- and post-participation periods. First differencing equation (1) for the 
treatment group and the control group eliminates the time invariant v term:   
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
] 0 , | [
] 1 , | [
it it it it
it it it it
u X D X Y E
u X D X Y E
∆ + ∆ = = ∆ ∆
∆ + + ∆ = = ∆ ∆
β
α β
            (3) 
where  Y ∆ is a lag operator such that  1 , − − = ∆ t i it Y Y Y .  The second difference between the 
differenced values of Y for the treatment and control groups in (3) may be expressed as: 
           ) ( ) ( ] 0 , | [ ] 1 , | [
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
it it it it it it it it u u X X D X Y E D X Y E ∆ − ∆ + + ∆ − ∆ = = ∆ ∆ − = ∆ ∆ α β  (4) 
 
Equation (4) yields an unbiased estimate of α  if the evolution over time of observable 
attributes of the two groups is similar, that is 
0 1
it it X X ∆ = ∆ , and if the changes in unobserved 
characteristics have means which do not depend upon allocation to treatment, that is, if 
0 1
it it u u ∆ = ∆ . 
We extend these analytic approaches to accommodate the specific panel structure of our 
panel data since we have a cohort of firms with observed characteristics and participation in 
programs between 1994 and 2005.  
5.2 Cox proportional Hazard Model 
Instead of using logit or probit models for program participation, we use a Cox proportional 
hazard model to estimate the propensity score of the likelihood of program participation for 
the sample of treatment and control groups followed over the 1994 to 2005 period.
5
Z
  The Cox 
proportional hazard model relates the likelihood of entry into a program, conditional upon 
survival (non-entry) up to that point in time, to a baseline hazard function and a set of 
independent variables  . The underlying hazard function  ,..) (t h  may be written as follows: 
                                                           
5 An alternative approach is to estimate separate logit models of program participation for different cross-sections 
(or year intervals) to derive propensity scores for each treatment cohort (or groups of cohorts).  This did not prove 
feasible because of small sample sizes, which led to very imprecise estimates of the logit model.  The Cox 
proportional hazards model was preferred not only because of sample size considerations but also for its unified 
treatment of the underlying process of selection into programs over time.  
24 
 
  ) ... exp( ). ( )} ,.. , ( ), {( 2 2 1 0 2 1 m m i m Z Z Z t h Z Z Z t h φ φ φ + + =  (5) 
where Z  is a vector of m  covariates, and  ) ( 0 t h  is the baseline hazard when the values of all 
the covariates are set to 0.  This model can be made linear by dividing both sides of equation 
(5) by  ) ( 0 t h  and taking natural logarithms:  
  m m i Z Z Z t h Z t h φ φ φ ... ) ( / )} ( ), ( log{ 2 2 1 0 + + =        (6) 
This leaves an equation (6) that is readily estimable, and from which the predicted value of 
Z . φ  can be calculated.  We use the relative hazard of program entry for firms with attributes 
Z   as the propensity score for defining the region of common support for matching 
successive cohorts of treated firms and their control group. 
 Table 19. Estimates from Cox Proportional Hazards Model. Results from Any Program 
Participation Model 
Independent variables  Hazard Ratio 
Standard 
Error  Z-statistic 
Region       
   Center  1.196  0.1133  1.89 
   Mexico City  0.824  0.0804  -1.98 
   Southern  1.251  0.1833  1.53 
Sector       
   Textile industry, clothing and 
leather industry  0.921  0.0998  -0.76 
   Wood products  1.150  0.1537  1.05 
   Paper products  0.471  0.1048  -3.39 
   Chemical  0.851  0.1044  -1.32 
   Mineral products  0.708  0.1487  -1.64 
   Basic metalic industry  0.819  0.2027  -0.81 
   Metallic products, machinery 
and equipment  1.064  0.1250  0.53 
   Other manufacturing industries  1.535  0.5984  1.1 
Age of firm  1.006  0.0020  3.24 
The firm is a branch  0.768  0.0670  -3.03  
25 
 
Foreign capital share (%)  1.000  0.0010  0.18 
Total sales growth (%)  1.001  0.0010  0.53 
Log(total sales) lagged 1 year  1.099  0.0276  3.76 
    Log likelihood:  -6285.7219 
Number observations: 21,321 
Number firms: 2,375 
Number firms participating: 838 
 
The Cox model estimates are used to predict the relative hazard rates for the treatment and 
control groups. Table 19 shows that a  coefficient greater than one indicates a higher 
probability of enrolling in any SME program. Thus, firms located outside Mexico City, older 
firms,  and firms with  higher production have a higher probability of enrolling in SME 
programs. As the propensity score for each firm, we use the mean of their hazard rates for all 
years in which they are available.
6 The hazard rate averaged 3.530 for the treatment group 
and 3.240 for the control group, consistent with the treatment group as a whole having a 
higher relative probability of program participation. The treatment group has greater density 
in the upper tail of the distribution of propensity scores than the control group (Figure 1). 
Nonetheless, within the region of common support, every firm in each group has a positive 














                                                           
6 For the treatment group, the means are computed for all years up until the year of program participation, after 
which relative hazards rates are not defined because the failure event has occurred. 
7 The region of common support lies between 1.154 and 7.777 since the minimum and maximum values for the 
treatment group was 1.108 and 8.0824, and 1.154 and 7.777 for the control group and 7.685.   
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Figure1. Distribution of Propensity Scores 
 
5.3 Panel Regressions  
As discussed, traditional propensity score matching methods are not suitable to accommodate 
the specific structure of our data.  We adopt a more flexible regression approach that allows 
us to estimate treatment effects taking into account differing entry points into programs, use 
of multiple types of programs, widely varying time since program participation, and year 
specific shocks.  We rely on fixed-effects models to eliminate the effects of unobserved firm 
heterogeneity as a source of bias in estimates of program impacts. In the spirit of the 
propensity score matching approach, we continue to focus on the sample of treatment and 
control group firms in the region of common support identified by their propensity scores.   
Consider an expanded equation (1) in levels: 
  it i it it it it it u YRS D D X Y + + + + = ν α α β * 2 1           (7) 
which includes the program indicator D, an interaction term between D and a variable 
YRS  measuring years-since-first-participated in the program, and the time-invariant error 
term i v . Estimating equation (7) in levels is likely to lead to biased estimates of α  because of 
the omitted variable  i v , with the direction of bias being determined by the correlation 
between  i v   and  i D .  The fixed effects estimator addresses this possibility by taking 











































) ( ) ( * ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 i it i it i it i it i it i it u u YRS YRS D D D D X X Y Y − + − − + − + − = − α α β   (8) 
where firm variable means are denoted by a single subscript i. Like first differencing, the 
fixed effects transformation eliminates the potentially confounding effects of  i v .   
First, we compare treatment effects estimated from a levels model (equation 7) and a fixed-
effects model (equation 8) to test for potential biases in estimates of treatment effects from 
unobserved firm heterogeneity.  Second, we test whether program impacts are larger in some 
programs than in others. In place of D, an indicator for participation in any program, we 
include indicator variables for participation in different types of SME programs 
ni i i D D D ,..., , 2 1 , and test for differences in their impacts on outcomes. We note that this 
specification allows for (but does not explicitly model) multiple program use since each 
program used by firm i has its own program start date. Finally, we investigate how long it 
takes for program impacts to be realized. We test for time effects of program impacts from 
2 α , the estimated coefficient on the YRS  interaction with D. An alternative, which we use, 
is to specify YRS  as a set of discrete time intervals to allow for non-linear time-effects of 
program participation. 
We use a parsimonious model specification designed to facilitate comparison across different 
regressions. The following EIA variables were selected for the study: value added, gross 
production, total sales, worked hours, wages, fixed assets, exports, and some other 
intermediate variables such as inputs, technology transfers, and technology. 
These outcome measures are related to program indicator variables that take on a value of 0 
for all years preceding the first-year of participation (pre-program period), and 1 for all years 
that follow including the first-year (post-program period).  In addition to the program 
variable(s), our explanatory variables include indicator variables for firm size (small, 
medium and large relative to the omitted micro firm), and year dummy variables for 1994 
through 2005 to control for the effects of year-specific stochastic shocks. 
 
6.- RESULTS 
Our objective is to estimate the longer-term impacts of program participation controlling for 
the effects of observed and unobservable productivity attributes, and to test for differences in 
the treatment effects of the programs and agencies discussed in Section 5.  Also of interest is 
investigating how quickly or slowly program impacts are realized over time.  Finally, we are 
interested in testing the sensitivity of program impact estimates to the possibility that 
program participation inhibits firm exit from our panel data. 
First, looking at the treatment effects on outcomes measured in levels, we notice positive 
results for participation in any program, suggesting that firms were already performing well 
compare to the control group (upper part of Table A1). However, these estimates are biases 
since we need to eliminate the effects of unobserved firm heterogeneity. When we 
disaggregate the results by agency, we find that the average treatment effects estimated for 
outcomes measured in levels are not significant for STPS and CONACyT programs, and  
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programs of the ME and Bancomext had negative effects on several outcome variables. The 
only group to show positive effects was Other Agency.  
Using the fixed-effects model presented in equation (8), we find that participation in any 
SME program has positive and significant effects of 6 percent on value added, 5 percent on 
gross production, 5 percent in total sales, 6 percent on employment, 6 percent on fixed assets. 
The average treatment effect of participation in programs by ME, CONACyT and Other 
Agency is now positive and statistically significant at the 1, 5, or 10 percent level for most 
outcomes (lower part of Table A1). The impact of ME programs ranges between 4 and 6 
percent, CONACyT between 7 and 26 percent and Other Agency between 3 and 14 percent. 
One can thus infer that programs under these agencies had on average a positive impact on 
the performance of SMEs. The only exception was the STPS program, which had a negative 
impact on some outcome variables, with the exception of the CIMO program up to 2001 
which exhibit a statistical significant positive effect of nearly 27 percent on fixed assets and 
technology transfer payments (Table A6). 
The results by program, for those with enough sample size captured in the ENESTYC 2005, 
indicate that in some programs, such as ME’s PROSEC and CONACyT’s Fiscal Support and 
Technology Innovation,  the average effects were not significant  in levels (equation 7). 
However, once corrected by time invariant biases, the effects turned to positive in differences 
(equation 8), suggesting positive impacts from these interventions (Table A2). The estimates 
for PNAA were positive in levels and positive in differences, suggesting  that firms 
participating in PNAA performed better than comparable firms, even once we control for 
time invariant bias due to unobservable characteristics. The estimated effect of PNAA is 6 
percent increase in value-added, with similar results for the rest of the outcome variables. 
The estimates for PROSEC and Fiscal Support and Technology Innovation were not 
significant in levels and were  positive and statistically significant in differences. The 
estimated impact of these programs ranges from 6 to 16 percent in outcome variables.  
The results for CIMO changed from not significant in levels to negative in differences.   
These results suggest that CIMO did not have an impact on the performance of firms. Firms 
that participated in CIMO up to 2001 showed a positive impact on selected outcome 
variables such as foreign sales, fixed assets and technology transfers (Table A6).  These 
results are in line with the earlier impact evaluation from Tan and Lopez-Acevedo (2005), 
which found positive impacts on intermediate outputs but no significant impacts on outcomes 
before 2001.  
A number of factors could explain why positive impacts were found for PNAA, PROSEC 
and CONACyT’s fiscal incentives program:  
•  On average, each firm benefited by CONACyT programs between 2001 and 2006 
received US$264,000, while the average amount that the federal government invested 
per firm in all of its programs was about US$22,000–12 times less.  The amount of 
resources per firm of CONACyT’s programs was second only to Bancomext.  
 
•  Another possible explanation for CONACyT’s programs is their support for innovation. 
Research indicates that the benefited firms had previously started doing research and  
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development around technological projects, lowering costs  compared to starting to 
innovate from scratch.  
   
•  The case of PROSEC is similar to the fiscal incentives of CONACyT. This program 
provides tax breaks for imported inputs needed for manufacturing, and hence individual 
firm internalizes its benefits. Therefore, it is in the firm’s interest to maximize utility in 
terms of quality and costs.  
 
•  The Environmental Audit Program (PNAA) is among the best known federal programs 
among manufacturing firms in 2002,  according to the CIPI (2002), and its use kept 
growing. Between 2002 and 2006, the program tripled the number of audits initiated—
from 293 in 2002 to 933 in 2006—and the number of clean industry certificates issued 
doubled in the same period, going from 169 in 2002 to 338 in 2006. The firm’s 
investment in the PNAA is relatively low and the benefits—such as accessing markets 
with tough environmental regulations—could far exceed costs.    
   
Thus far, we have estimated the average treatment effect of program participation without 
consideration for whether these effects vary over time. We test for time effects by including 
interactions terms between the program participation measure and time since entering a 
program, as in equation (8). Rather than forcing a functional form on these time effects (for 
example,  with a quadratic specification of time and time squared), we define a set of 
indicator variables for different intervals (1, 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 7-9 and over 10 years) following the 
date of entering the program. This allows the effects of the interaction terms between the 
program indicator and time since participation to vary non-linearly with time in and after the 
program. 
The resulting estimates can be interpreted as the time effects of treatment if several 
assumptions hold. First, these effects are estimated holding constant all other time-varying 
factors, including inflation and macroeconomic shocks.  The model accounts for these factors 
by including year dummy variables to capture year-specific stochastic shocks. A second 
assumption is that self-selection into treatment is not dependent upon time. The presence of 
cohort effects in treatment—firms that choose to participate early are different from those 
that join in later years—can introduce bias into these estimates.  
None of the indicator variables for time since participation are statistically significant before 
four  years  (Table  A3).  Beginning with four  year after program entry, the estimated 
coefficient in fixed assets become positive and increase in value and statistical significance.  
Using the example of fixed assets, the treatment effect is 7 percent at four years, increasing to 
14 percent at 5-6 years, after to 22 percent at 7-9 years and then to 42 percent from 10 years 
on since program entry.   
One issue that arises is that our data set does not include firms (including treatment firms) 
that exit.  This raises the possibility of survivor bias if program participation increases the 
possibility of firms surviving that would otherwise exit (stop operations).  In the absence of  
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good data on firm exit probabilities, we bound our estimates of program impacts by 
sensitivity analysis in which we re-estimate outcome models after dropping the bottom 5 
percent of the treatment group in terms of outcome variables  (e.g productivity, assuming that 
the lowest productivity firms would otherwise exit).   
Several points emerge from comparing the treatment effects with trimming and the original 
fixed effect models (Tables A4  and  A5).  First, the significance and magnitude of the 
program impact is quite similar under the trimming and the original estimates. Second, there 
are isolated differences between both groups: for some programs or variables the estimates 
based on trimming data were slightly higher than the original estimates. For example, for ME 
programs, the outcome variables of employment, gross production, and total sales effects in 
the trimmed data barely increased compared to the original estimates.  Second, for STPS 
programs, the treatment effects of some variables such as sales, gross production and value 
added in the original were negative and now are not significant. The key point to infer from 
this sensitivity analysis is that, in general, the direction and size of treatment effects are 
robust to controls for potential biases from firm exit. 
 
7.- CONCLUSIONS  
The significant public resources invested by Mexico in recent years into programs supporting 
SMEs are not well evaluated. While promoting a more vibrant SME sector is a laudable goal, 
the relative success of current and past programs is difficult to ascertain with any rigor. This 
paper attempts to contribute to broadening and deepening efforts to evaluate SME program 
impacts, with the goal of improving the efficiency and effectiveness with which these 
resources are spent. It does so, first, by providing a detailed description of many of the main 
recent programs administered by various government agencies, and second, by designing and 
implementing a novel evaluation methodology to better assess outcome impacts over time.  
Microenterprises and SMEs make up 99 percent of enterprises in Mexico, employ about 64 
percent of the workforce, and account for over 40 percent of GDP.  Given the importance of 
SME in the economy, governments in Mexico over the last 20 years have put in place a wide 
variety of SME support programs.  An inventory identified 151 SME programs administered 
by different government agencies including CONACyT, Bancomext, and the ministries of 
economy, labor, finance, and environment, among others.  While their stated objectives may 
differ, collectively these support programs seek to promote the productivity, quality, and 
competitiveness of small enterprises, encourage technology upgrading, training, and 
conservation, and improve earnings and safe working conditions for the workforce in SMEs.  
As is apparent from the overview in Section 2, Mexico has a huge array of programs 
involved in supporting SMEs in some way. This in itself is an important finding, and 
suggests that Mexico would do well to design a more coherent framework to orient resources 
more efficiently and strategically, and avoid program overlap. As well, the lack of easily 
available information on program budgets, activities and beneficiaries points to a need for 
improved consolidation of information on SME support, to improve the ability of 
policymakers to make evaluations and comparisons, and ensure that the country’s scarce 
fiscal resources are achieving the greatest possible impact.   
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Just how effective these SME programs have been in achieving their objectives is unclear.  In 
Mexico, impact evaluations of SME programs are rare—most are qualitative in nature and 
small in scope, either measuring beneficiary satisfaction with support services or else easily 
quantified program-coverage indicators. Few measure the net benefits of program 
participation by comparing the performance of beneficiaries with that of a comparison group 
made up of similar enterprises that did not participate in the program, and on which cost-
benefit assessments are made.  None take into account the complicated biases from 
unobserved firm heterogeneity and self-selection that plague efforts to measure the true 
impacts of program participation.  Mexico is not unique in this regard.  Most countries, both 
advanced and developing, are still in the process of increasing rigorously evaluation of their 
SME programs, as noted in the forthcoming World Bank Regional Study  on Impact 
Evaluation of SME programs.  
This paper uses a unique firm panel data to rigorously evaluate the impacts of SME programs 
in Mexico. The paper makes use of the program module in the ENESTYC 2001 and 2005, 
which include retrospective questions about firm participation, date-of-participation, and type 
of support received in, and familiarity with any one or more of SME programs administered 
by several agencies.  The ENESTYC was linked to the EIA to form a panel of firms over 10 
years. In this way, pre- and post-program outcomes variables are tracked over time for both 
the treatment and control groups.   
Several approaches are used to assess the impacts of program participation. A generalization 
of propensity-score matching and DID estimation adapted to the structure of our panel data is 
used to test for program impacts on intermediate and final outcome measures. This approach 
allowed for controlling selection biases that have plagued previous impact evaluation studies 
such as self-selection, unobserved heterogeneity and attrition. 
Our results indicate that program participation in certain types of SME programs is 
associated with higher value added, sales, export, and employment.  This is the case for the 
programs of the Ministry of Economy (PROSEC), PNAA, and CONACyT’s Fiscal Incentive 
Programs.  Why these programs yielded positive effects and programs like CIMO did not? 
Maybe because these three programs (PROSEC), PNAA, and CONACyT’s Fiscal Incentive 
tend to reach the crème of SMEs: mid-sized, exporting firms with high technology, clean 
processes,  and  more human and physical capital-intensive  production techniques. The 
implication is that this type of firm may have very different characteristics in comparison to 
those served by other programs—i.e., smaller, local-market oriented, low-tech, less human 
and physical capital intensive. 
Our panel data also identifies the timing of the effects of program participation on outcomes. 
We found that some of the positive effects take some time after the third or fourth year of 
exposure into the program. These results remain robust after trimming the bottom 5 percent 
of our treatment group. 
Several research lines emerge from our analysis. One key finding is that the very high 
number of programs and their constant evolution over time (changing names and structures, 
closing old programs and opening new ones) makes rigorous impact evaluations a major 
challenge. Thus one area is to investigate is cohort effects in the panel for those programs  
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that underwent major design changes. An initial research was carried out in this paper with 
the CIMO-PAC that could serve as example for the analysis of other programs. We plan to 
carry out further analysis for the CIMO-PAC program, which has been in place for the last 










production  Total sales  Employment  Worked 







Levels Model                                         
Any program  0.241  **  0.231  **  0.220  **  0.157  ***  0.163  ***  0.058     0.181  *  0.179     0.286     -0.163    
  (0.1)    (0.09)    (0.1)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.11)    (0.19)    (0.23)    (0.2)   
                                         
STPS   -0.143     -0.155     -0.152     -0.015     -0.004     -0.086     -0.060     -0.418     -0.270     -0.139    
  (0.14)    (0.14)    (0.14)    (0.08)    (0.08)    (0.07)    (0.16)    (0.28)    (0.34)    (0.3)   
                                         
ME  -0.269     -0.357  **  -0.349  *  0.038     0.027     -0.186  **  -0.438  **  0.283     0.591     -0.449    
  (0.19)    (0.18)    (0.18)    (0.1)    (0.1)    (0.09)    (0.2)    (0.37)    (0.44)    (0.39)   
                                         
BANCOMEXT  -1.000  ***  -1.116  ***  -1.192  ***  -0.230     -0.233     -0.386  ***  -0.891  ***  0.366     -1.131  *  0.487    
  (0.27)    (0.26)    (0.27)    (0.15)    (0.15)    (0.13)    (0.3)    (0.5)    (0.67)    (0.51)   
                                         
CONACyT  -0.063     -0.055     -0.052     -0.077     -0.112     0.096     -0.040     -0.527     0.398     -0.283    
  (0.23)    (0.22)    (0.23)    (0.13)    (0.13)    (0.11)    (0.25)    (0.41)    (0.52)    (0.42)   
                                         
Other Agency  0.853  ***  0.894  ***  0.897  ***  0.353  ***  0.374  ***  0.299  ***  0.749  ***  0.520  **  0.600  *  -0.107    
  (0.13)    (0.12)    (0.13)    (0.07)    (0.07)    (0.06)    (0.14)    (0.25)    (0.31)    (0.26)   
Fixed Effects Model                                       
Any program  0.052  ***  0.049  ***  0.046  ***  0.060  ***  0.060  ***  0.006     0.059  ***  -0.035     -0.091     -0.025    
  (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.04)    (0.06)    (0.06)   
                                         
STPS   -0.046  **  -0.030  *  -0.034  **  -0.003     -0.007     -0.001     0.061  **  -0.252  ***  0.267  ***  -0.110    
  (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.03)    (0.06)    (0.1)    (0.09)   
                                         
ME  0.069  ***  0.052  ***  0.051  ***  0.034  **  0.035  **  -0.005     -0.041     0.013     -0.139     0.028    
  (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.03)    (0.06)    (0.1)    (0.09)   
                                         
BANCOMEXT  -0.063     0.018     0.041     -0.025     -0.026     -0.032  *  -0.094  *  -0.075     0.235     -0.354  **  
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  (0.04)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.05)    (0.09)    (0.2)    (0.14)   
                                         
CONACyT  0.100  ***  0.094  ***  0.082  ***  0.092  ***  0.088  ***  0.001     0.066  *  0.253  ***  0.082     0.247  ** 
  (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.04)    (0.07)    (0.11)    (0.11)   
                                         
Other Agency  0.077  ***  0.062  ***  0.061  ***  0.045  ***  0.051  ***  0.026  ***  0.110  ***  0.036     -0.103     0.082    
  (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.05)    (0.08)    (0.08)   
                                         
Sample size  27506  27742  27376  27658  27655  26957  27260  13445  5924  9049 
 





production  Total sales  Employment  Worked 







Levels Model                                         
CIMO   -0.069    0.0022    0.0746    -0.016    0.0035    0.0699    0.1753    -0.265    0.3865    -0.436   
  (0.21)    (0.21)    (0.22)    (0.12)    (0.12)    (0.1)    (0.24)    (0.42)    (0.53)    (0.42)   
                                         
PROSEC   -0.091     -0.054     -0.019     -0.049     -0.138     0.161     -0.125     1.575  ***  0.548     -0.844    
  (0.32)    (0.31)    (0.32)    (0.18)    (0.18)    (0.16)    (0.35)    (0.59)    (0.8)    (0.65)   
                                         
PNAA   0.981  ***  0.921  ***  0.912  ***  0.317  ***  0.345  ***  0.297  ***  0.992  ***  0.727  *  0.437     0.671    
  (0.21)    (0.2)    (0.21)    (0.12)    (0.12)    (0.1)    (0.23)    (0.4)    (0.49)    (0.48)   
                                         
Fiscal Support &  -0.010     0.116     0.179     -0.039     -0.074     0.166     0.240     -0.055     0.553     -0.339    
Tech. Innovation  (0.29)    (0.29)    (0.3)    (0.16)    (0.16)    (0.14)    (0.33)    (0.56)    (0.8)    (0.49)   
                                         
State Goverment   1.489  ***  1.161  **  1.078  *  0.273     0.282     0.165     0.687     0.472     0.834     1.595    
Support  (0.57)    (0.57)    (0.58)    (0.32)    (0.32)    (0.27)    (0.63)    (1.1)    (1.72)    (1.1)   
Fixed Effects Model                         
CIMO   -0.06  **  -0.04  *  -0.046  **  -0.03  *  -0.03  *  -0.003    0.0533    -0.084    -0.01    -0.322  ** 
  (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.04)    (0.08)    (0.15)    (0.13)   
                                         
PROSEC   0.167  ***  0.164  ***  0.133  ***  0.058  ***  0.069  ***  0.003     0.136  ***  0.153  *  0.217     0.137    
  (0.04)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.05)    (0.08)    (0.15)    (0.14)   
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PNAA   0.065  **  0.043  **  0.058  ***  -0.023     -0.014     0.052  ***  0.074  **  0.065     -0.032     -0.199    
  (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.04)    (0.07)    (0.12)    (0.13)   
                                         
Fiscal Support &  0.146  ***  0.094  ***  0.094  ***  0.108  ***  0.100  ***  -0.015     -0.001     0.160  *  -0.106     0.370  *** 
Tech. Innovation  (0.04)    (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.04)    (0.09)    (0.14)    (0.14)   
                                         
State Goverment   0.155  **  0.025     -0.017     0.057     0.075  *  -0.040     0.127     -0.101     0.255     0.165    
Support  (0.07)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.03)    (0.09)    (0.15)    (0.32)    (0.46)   
                                         
Sample size  21501     21663     21379     21631     21629     21106     21319     10921     4603     7207    
Source:  Linked ENESTYC-EIA panel data. 
Notes:     1)  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
2) Numbers in () correspond to standard errors. 
 
Table A3. Time Effects of Any Program Participation (time since started the program). Fixed Effects Model with Propensity Score Matching 
Outcome variable  1 year later     2 years later     3 years later     4 years later    
5 - 6 years 
later     7 - 9 year later    
10 + year 
later    
Sample 
size 
Value added  0.000       0.003       -0.026       0.013       0.029       -0.073       0.054       27506 
  (0.029)      (0.031)      (0.033)      (0.034)      (0.033)      (0.049)      (0.133)       
                                             
Gross production  0.005      0.019      0.004      0.006       0.029      0.028      0.150       27742 
  (0.02)      (0.022)      (0.022)      (0.023)      (0.023)      (0.034)      (0.092)       
                                             
Total sales  0.014      0.024      0.005      0.006       0.016      0.060  *    0.196  **    27376 
  (0.02)      (0.021)      (0.022)      (0.023)      (0.022)      (0.034)      (0.091)       
                                             
Employment  0.010       0.006       -0.020       -0.034  *    -0.028       -0.054  **    0.043       27658 
  (0.015)      (0.016)      (0.017)      (0.018)      (0.017)      (0.026)      (0.069)       
                                             
Worked hours  0.008       0.008       -0.024       -0.039  **    -0.021       -0.050  *    0.044       27655 
  (0.016)      (0.017)      (0.018)      (0.019)      (0.018)      (0.027)      (0.074)       
                                             
Wages  -0.012       -0.004       0.003       0.000       -0.009       0.035  *    0.096  *    26957 
  (0.012)      (0.013)      (0.014)      (0.014)      (0.014)      (0.021)      (0.057)       
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Fixed assets  -0.011       -0.015       0.013       0.071  *    0.136  ***    0.217  ***    0.416  ***    27260 
  (0.036)      (0.038)      (0.04)      (0.041)      (0.04)      (0.06)      (0.162)       
                                             
Inputs  0.008       0.027       0.005       0.006       0.038       0.091  **    0.262  ***    27736 
  (0.021)      (0.023)      (0.024)      (0.025)      (0.024)      (0.036)      (0.098)       
                                             
Foreign sales  -0.022       -0.026       0.015       -0.059       -0.052       -0.079       -0.304       13445 
  (0.065)      (0.071)      (0.075)      (0.079)      (0.075)      (0.116)      (0.34)       
                                             
Tech. transfers payments  0.043       -0.005       -0.115       0.043       0.042       -0.215       0.210       5924 
  (0.105)      (0.113)      (0.122)      (0.127)      (0.127)      (0.183)      (0.54)       
                                             
Maquila services   -0.102       -0.049       0.174       0.125       0.018       -0.190       0.238       9049 
   (0.106)        (0.115)        (0.122)        (0.13)        (0.127)        (0.179)        (0.432)          
Source:  Linked ENESTYC-EIA panel data. 
Notes:     1)  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.   2) Numbers in () correspond to standard errors. 
 





production  Total sales  Employment  Worked 







Any program  0.064  ***  0.053  ***  0.052  ***  0.057  ***  0.056  ***  0.019  ***  0.081  ***  0.015     -0.097  *  0.005    
  (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.06)    (0.06)   
                                         
STPS   -0.036     -0.023     -0.025     -0.004     -0.004     0.014     0.073  ***  -0.263  ***  0.204  **  -0.025    
  (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.03)    (0.06)    (0.1)    (0.09)   
                                         
ME   0.053  **  0.056  ***  0.053  ***  0.043  ***  0.039  ***  0.002     -0.024     0.077     -0.088     0.081    
  (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.03)    (0.06)    (0.1)    (0.09)   
                                         
BANCOMEXT  -0.062     0.029     0.044     -0.001     -0.002     0.006     -0.095  *  -0.010     0.186     -0.371  *** 
  (0.04)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.05)    (0.09)    (0.19)    (0.14)   
                                         
CONACyT  0.138  ***  0.100  ***  0.085  ***  0.077  ***  0.071  ***  -0.015     0.055     0.262  ***  -0.028     0.236  **  
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  (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.04)    (0.07)    (0.11)    (0.11)   
                                         
Other Agency  0.071  ***  0.049  ***  0.052  ***  0.030  ***  0.033  ***  0.035  ***  0.139  ***  0.039     -0.067     0.077    
  (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.05)    (0.07)    (0.08)   
                                         
Sample size  27006     27299     26878     27181     27159     26496     26786     13161     5802     8882    
Source:  Linked ENESTYC-EIA panel data. 
Notes:     1)  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.   
2) Numbers in () correspond to standard errors. 
 





production  Total sales  Employment  Worked 







CIMO  -0.036    -0.032    -0.037  *  -0.031  **  -0.028  *  0.0033    0.0509    -0.128  *  0.098    -0.26  ** 
  (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.04)    (0.08)    (0.15)    (0.13)   
                                         
PROSEC   0.127  ***  0.169  ***  0.140  ***  0.048  **  0.048  **  0.029  *  0.125  **  0.195  **  0.182     0.224    
  (0.04)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.05)    (0.08)    (0.15)    (0.14)   
                                         
PNAA   0.068  **  0.053  **  0.069  ***  -0.041  ***  -0.036  **  0.063  ***  0.107  ***  0.055     -0.033     -0.090    
  (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.04)    (0.07)    (0.12)    (0.13)   
                                         
Fiscal Support &  0.160  ***  0.114  ***  0.110  ***  0.073  ***  0.071  ***  -0.020     0.001     0.225  ***  -0.208     0.373  *** 
Tech. Innovation  (0.04)    (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.05)    (0.08)    (0.14)    (0.14)   
                                         
State Goverment   0.128  *  0.029     -0.036     0.057     0.065  *  -0.052  *  0.106     -0.035     0.272     0.514    
Support  (0.07)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.03)    (0.09)    (0.15)    (0.31)    (0.47)   
                                         
Sample size  21140     21329     21017     21269     21260     20792     20982     10701     4516     7084    
Source:  Linked ENESTYC-EIA panel data. 
Notes:     1)  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.   




Table A6. Program Impacts of CIMO in ENESTYC 2001. Models with Propensity Score Matching 




Total sales  Employment  Worked 
hours 









Levels Model                                         
CIMO   -
0.249 
   -0.301  *  -
0.346 
**  -0.084     -
0.080 








   -
0.177 
 
  (0.17)    (0.17)    (0.17)    (0.09)    (0.09)    (0.08)    (0.2)    (0.35)    (0.4)    (0.39)   
                                         
Fixed Effects Model                                         
CIMO   -
0.028 
   -0.010     -
0.014 
   0.016     0.006     0.004     0.085  **  -
0.286 
***  0.459  ***  0.150   
  (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.04)    (0.08)    (0.14)    (0.13)   
                                         
Sample size  22269     22452     22147     22386     22383     21835     22116     11411     5079     7309    
                                         
Fixed Effects Model. Trimming Bottom 5% of Treatment Group Outcomes 
                       
CIMO  -
0.048 
   -0.014     -
0.010 
  0.006     -
0.002 
   0.026  **  0.103  ***  -
0.253 
***  0.154    0.149   
  (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)   
                                         
Sample size  22075     22290     21955     22196     22188     21644     21939     11315     5039     7254    
Source:  Linked ENESTYC-EIA panel data. 
Notes:     1)  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.   
2) Numbers in () correspond to standard errors. 
 
 
Table A7. Differences in Means Between the Treatment and the Control Group, by Program or Agency 
  
Year when program starts 
(t-0)    
Two years after program 
started (t+2)  
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Outcome mesures  Difference in means  t-test     Difference in means  t-test 
               
CIMO               
Employment  -43     -1.01    -29     -0.54 
Worked hours  -117     -1.15    -76     -0.59 
Wages  -9,255     -1.03    -8,562     -0.79 
Gross production  -303,104     -1.25    -345,393     -1.19 
Value added  -113,099     -0.98    -172,786     -1.40 
Fixed assets  -193,055  **  -2.63    -193,925  **  -1.96 
Domestic sales  -108,115  *  -1.69    -99,548     -1.14 
Foreign sales  -164,875     -1.07    -180,879     -0.96 
Total sales  -272,990     -1.47    -280,428     -1.18 
Technology transfers payments  1,964     0.49    1,081     0.36 
Technology transfers incomes  -133     -0.44    -162     -0.30 
Maquila services expenditures  -700     -0.52     -1,117     -0.69 
               
PROSEC               
Employment  187  **  3.15    177  **  2.84 
Worked hours  394  **  2.71    389  **  2.55 
Wages  45,108  **  3.44    42,438  **  3.20 
Gross production  704,012  **  2.39    954,131  **  2.93 
Value added  252,437  **  2.26    508,979  **  3.77 
Fixed assets  -207,734  **  -2.44    -33,804     -0.35 
Domestic sales  115,450     1.20    125,036     1.11 
Foreign sales  609,016  **  2.83    584,511  **  2.70 
Total sales  721,094  **  2.66    714,333  **  2.48 
Technology transfers payments  -756     -0.14    -206     -0.05 
Technology transfers incomes  -117     -0.28    -143     -0.24 
Maquila services expenditures  -1,094     -0.58     -412     -0.21 
               
PNAA               
Employment  122  **  2.93    136  **  2.64 
Worked hours  315  **  3.14    326  **  2.61 
Wages  20,203  **  2.28    24,873  **  2.34 
Gross production  117,217     0.49    94,694     0.34 
Value added  48,386     0.43    30,441     0.25  
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Fixed assets  -106,174     -1.49    -205,590  **  -2.15 
Domestic sales  173,235  **  2.82    176,821  **  2.11 
Foreign sales  -65,276     -0.43    -53,454     -0.29 
Total sales  107,958     0.60    123,367     0.53 
Technology transfers payments  356     0.09    1,277     0.40 
Technology transfers incomes  -120     -0.40    244     0.46 
Maquila services expenditures  -29     -0.02     643     0.47 
               
Fiscal Support and Technological Innovation             
Employment  36     0.76    49     0.81 
Worked hours  67     0.59    123     0.83 
Wages  5,828     0.58    11,602     0.93 
Gross production  -137,372     -0.51    -205,452     -0.61 
Value added  -76,014     -0.59    -82,757     -0.57 
Fixed assets  -96,081     -1.18    -120,148     -1.06 
Domestic sales  -31,145     -0.44    -63,476     -0.63 
Foreign sales  -52,448     -0.30    -88,517     -0.41 
Total sales  -83,593     -0.40    -151,994     -0.56 
Technology transfers payments  350     0.08    3,055     0.80 
Technology transfers incomes  -79     -0.23    -186     -0.30 
Maquila services expenditures  418     0.27     -284     -0.15 
               
State Goverment Support               
Employment  151  **  1.98    124     1.15 
Worked hours  375  **  2.04    295     1.13 
Wages  18,260     1.14    26,363     1.20 
Gross production  47,695     0.11    118,247     0.20 
Value added  -23,143     -0.11    11,102     0.04 
Fixed assets  25,709     0.19    -108,968     -0.55 
Domestic sales  83,385     0.72    189,488     1.07 
Foreign sales  21,853     0.08    -23,097     -0.06 
Total sales  105,238     0.32    166,391     0.35 
Technology transfers payments  1,369     0.19    915     0.14 
Technology transfers incomes  -122     -0.23    269     0.25 
Maquila services expenditures  -51     -0.02     -439     -0.13 
               
STPS Programs               
Employment  -9     -0.27    11     0.30  
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Worked hours  -33     -0.42    23     0.25 
Wages  -5,296     -0.80    -1,388     -0.19 
Gross production  -298,296  *  -1.76    -352,139  *  -1.92 
Value added  -114,297     -1.42    -154,592  **  -1.97 
Fixed assets  -217,885  **  -4.14    -223,928  **  -3.52 
Domestic sales  -106,498  **  -2.20    -106,589  *  -1.76 
Foreign sales  -149,780     -1.40    -169,639     -1.43 
Total sales  -256,278  **  -1.97    -276,228  *  -1.83 
Technology transfers payments  164     0.06    -621     -0.32 
Technology transfers incomes  -118     -0.56    44     0.13 
Maquila services expenditures  -737     -0.76     -1,269     -1.12 
               
ME Programs               
Employment  73  *  1.94    88  **  2.17 
Worked hours  144     1.56    198  **  2.00 
Wages  13,110     1.62    16,425  *  1.93 
Gross production  195,511     1.16    318,116  *  1.70 
Value added  37,485     0.57    146,829  *  1.83 
Fixed assets  -222,112  **  -4.34    -145,117  **  -2.48 
Domestic sales  -46,509     -0.78    -51,251     -0.72 
Foreign sales  284,039  **  2.39    301,320  **  2.56 
Total sales  237,530     1.54    250,068     1.52 
Technology transfers payments  -1,102     -0.35    -749     -0.33 
Technology transfers incomes  -110     -0.46    -122     -0.35 
Maquila services expenditures  -1,131     -1.00     -1,208     -0.95 
               
BANCOMEXT Programs               
Employment  -38     -0.68    -49     -0.74 
Worked hours  -101     -0.74    -101     -0.63 
Wages  -14,186     -1.22    -16,255     -1.22 
Gross production  -316,839     -1.08    -473,986     -1.46 
Value added  -144,087     -1.03    -186,754     -1.31 
Fixed assets  -131,265     -1.41    -255,569  **  -2.26 
Domestic sales  -144,394  *  -1.74    -264,778  **  -2.47 
Foreign sales  -97,827     -0.53    -129,629     -0.62 
Total sales  -242,222     -1.07    -394,407     -1.48 
Technology transfers payments  -3,372     -0.70    -3,153     -0.86 
Technology transfers incomes  -106     -0.29    -117     -0.20  
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Maquila services expenditures  -841     -0.50     -699     -0.34 
               
CONACyT Programs               
Employment  54     1.33    66     1.32 
Worked hours  110     1.12    147     1.21 
Wages  6,802     0.81    11,325     1.12 
Gross production  -100,911     -0.47    -137,665     -0.55 
Value added  -75,559     -0.74    -83,202     -0.76 
Fixed assets  -95,152     -1.43    -106,643     -1.22 
Domestic sales  -9,132     -0.15    -25,182     -0.31 
Foreign sales  -45,119     -0.34    -63,588     -0.39 
Total sales  -54,251     -0.33    -88,770     -0.43 
Technology transfers payments  1,036     0.30    5,387  *  1.90 
Technology transfers incomes  -72     -0.27    -149     -0.33 
Maquila services expenditures  744     0.60     633     0.40 
               
Other Agency Programs               
Employment  151  **  5.49    153  **  4.97 
Worked hours  359  **  5.51    383  **  5.08 
Wages  27,687  **  4.88    30,350  **  4.80 
Gross production  94,599     0.66    116,169     0.73 
Value added  8,318     0.12    20,283     0.29 
Fixed assets  -131,760  **  -3.10    -111,801  **  -2.05 
Domestic sales  205,522  **  5.01    214,445  **  4.18 
Foreign sales  -76,837     -0.85    -55,726     -0.54 
Total sales  128,685     1.17    158,719     1.21 
Technology transfers payments  1,450     0.61    453     0.27 
Technology transfers incomes  77     0.40    21     0.07 
Maquila services expenditures  766     0.94     317     0.35 
Source:  Linked ENESTYC-EIA panel data. 
Notes:     (1) Monetary variables are in real 2005 pesos. 
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